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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2924 
_____________ 
 
STEFAN FREETH 
 
v. 
 
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., 
                                                              Appellant  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-02274) 
District Judge:  Hon. Gerald A. McHugh 
_____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 24, 2016 ) 
______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 ______________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Defendant Zurich American Insurance Co. (“Zurich”) appeals a summary 
judgment order entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Pennsylvania on July 16, 2015, declaring that Zurich is liable for up to $1,000,000 in 
uninsured motorist (“UM”) insurance coverage in relation to injuries suffered by plaintiff 
Stefan Freeth.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.    
I. 
 Because we write exclusively for the parties, we set forth only those facts 
necessary to our disposition.  Freeth was seriously injured in September 2012 while 
working on the back of a truck owned by his employer, Road-Con, Inc.  A passing 
tractor-trailer struck a traffic sign, propelling it into Freeth’s leg.  Because the tractor-
trailer was never identified, Road-Con’s business insurance provided UM coverage for 
Freeth’s injuries.  That insurance policy was issued by Zurich.  
 Freeth filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration that the policy provides $1,000,000 
in UM coverage.  In response, Zurich argued that the policy has a much lower limit of 
$35,000 in UM coverage because in February 2012, prior to Freeth’s injury, Road-Con 
(through its president) signed an Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage 
Selection/Rejection Limits Summary Form (“Summary Form”) electing to reduce the 
UM coverage to $35,000.  Freeth argued that the signature on the Summary Form was 
not a sufficiently clear manifestation of intent to reduce the coverage, especially in light 
of language in both the Summary Form and the cover letter accompanying it, which 
warned Road-Con that it was not enough merely to sign and return the Summary Form 
because it was also necessary to review and sign state-specific forms enclosed with the 
Summary Form.  Thus, argued Freeth, the UM coverage defaulted to the same amount as 
the bodily injury liability coverage, or $1,000,000, by operation of Pennsylvania law.   
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 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  On July 16, 2015, the 
District Court granted Freeth’s summary judgment motion, declaring that Zurich must 
provide $1,000,000 in UM coverage, and denied Zurich’s motion.  It reasoned that 
because Zurich did not enclose, and Road-Con did not sign, any Pennsylvania-specific 
form designating $35,000 as the amount of UM coverage, the requirements stated in the 
Summary Form and cover letter for reducing coverage were not met, and coverage 
defaulted to limits imposed by operation of state law.  Zurich timely appealed.     
II. 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s final decision.  
“We exercise plenary review over a district court order granting summary judgment.”  
Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015).  
“Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.’”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).   
III. 
 Under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1731, “an insurance company issuing a policy in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania must provide [uninsured/underinsured motorist] 
coverage equal to the bodily injury liability coverage, unless the insured validly rejects 
UM/UIM coverage or validly requests lower limits of coverage pursuant to section 
1734.”  Weilacher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 A.3d 976, 983 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2013).  Section 1734, in turn, provides that “[a] named insured may request in writing the 
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issuance of coverages . . . in amounts equal to or less than the limits of liability for bodily 
injury.”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1734.  “[T]o conform with § 1734, the written request must 
be signed by the insured and must contain an express designation of the amount of 
coverage requested, all manifesting the insured’s desire to purchase coverage in amounts 
less than the bodily injury limits.”  Weilacher, 65 A.3d at 983 (quoting Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Catalini, 18 A.3d 1206, 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011)).  Section 1734 does not 
“dictate[ ] the particular language that the parties must utilize.”  Hartford Ins. Co. v. 
O’Mara, 907 A.2d 589, 603 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (en banc).  “[T]he language utilized 
need only convey an insured’s desire to purchase uninsured and underinsured coverage in 
amounts less than or equal to bodily injury limits and the amount of the requested 
coverage.”  Id.   
 Freeth does not dispute that there was a signed writing (the Summary Form) that 
contained a table listing “Selected Limits” for “Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists 
Coverage” in each state, including a limit of $35,000 for Pennsylvania.  Rather, he argues 
that the Summary Form did not constitute a “request” under section 1734 manifesting 
Road-Con’s desire to purchase that amount of coverage.  We agree.   
 Like the District Court, we find it significant that the Summary Form contained 
the following language, located before the table that listed the proposed amount of 
reduced coverage for each state:   
 Your policy(s) contain Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage 
 Selection/Rejection and Limits Options forms which allow you to reject 
 coverage or to select various limits and coverage options.  Your signature 
 on this summary form indicates that you have read and understand each 
 state-specific form and that the selections or rejections marked on the state 
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 forms have been accepted by you.  This form provides a summary of the 
 selected Limits by State.  However, in those states [including Pennsylvania] 
 marked with an asterisk (*), the first named insured must sign that state’s 
 selection/rejection form.   
 
Appendix (“App.”) 187.  Following the table was another proviso: 
 Failure to return the signed Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist (UM/UIM) 
 Selection/Rejection Summary Form and required state-specific forms prior 
 to the policy inception date(s) will result in the policy being issued with 
 coverage limits imposed by operation of state law. . . .  THIS SUMMARY 
 IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR REVIEWING EACH INDIVIDUAL 
 STATE’S SELECTION/REJECTION FORM FOR UM AND UIM 
 COVERAGE.  YOU ARE REQUIRED TO DO SO. 
 
Id. at 188.  And by signing, Road-Con “acknowledge[d] that [it] ha[d] reviewed each 
individual state’s selection/rejection form.”  Id.  The cover letter accompanying the forms 
contained similar warnings.  Id. at 255-57.   
 Road-Con never signed a state-specific Pennsylvania form requesting reduced UM 
coverage, even though it did so for other states.  Thus, to prevail, Zurich must show that 
the Summary Form by itself constituted a “request,” notwithstanding the language in the 
Summary Form warning insureds that signing the Summary Form was insufficient to 
effect a reduction in coverage.  Zurich fails to do so.   
 It is true that Road-Con signed and returned three Pennsylvania-specific forms, 
which dealt with other issues.  Id. at 233-35.  It could therefore be argued that Road-Con 
satisfied all the requirements set out in the Summary Form for reducing coverage, insofar 
as it signed and returned Pennsylvania-specific forms that were included.    
 But such a reading of the Summary Form is hyper-technical and unnatural.  
“When analyzing an insurance policy, a court must construe words of common usage in 
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their natural, plain, and ordinary sense.”  D’Adamo v. Erie Ins. Exch., 4 A.3d 1090, 1096 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (quoting Continental Cas. Co. v. Pro Machine, 916 A.2d 1111, 
1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).  “A court must not ‘distort the 
meaning of the language or resort to a strained contrivance in order to find an 
ambiguity.’”  Id. (quoting Mitsock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 909 A.2d 828, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2006)).  To any reasonable reader, the repeated emphatic warnings in the Summary Form 
would create an expectation that coverage amounts within a given state would be set at 
levels provided by law unless a form designed and submitted specifically for that state 
requested otherwise.  Zurich need not send such a form to its insureds, nor is such a form 
required to reduce UM coverage under Pennsylvania law.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 639 (3d Cir. 2000); Lewis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 793 A.2d 143, 
155 (Pa. 2002).  But if Zurich warned its insureds that an additional state-specific form 
was needed to reduce coverage and did not enclose the form (or enclosed it but never 
received it back), it cannot now prevail on the theory that an insured’s signature on the 
very document that contained the warning was, in the absence of the state-specific form, 
a sufficient manifestation of intent to reduce coverage.  Cf. Stemple v. Zurich Am. Ins. 
Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1311 (D. Kan. 2008) (“[T]he Summary Form clearly indicates 
that elections made on individual state forms control what selections or rejections have 
been made, rather than the Summary Form itself.”).  
 We do not mean to suggest that short summary documents akin to the Summary 
Form can never suffice to reduce coverage under section 1734; they can suffice.  See 
Orsag v. Farmers New Century Ins., 15 A.3d 896, 897, 901 (Pa. 2011) (enforcing a 
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coverage reduction where an insured wrote desired coverage amounts on blanks on a 
two-page “mostly pre-printed” insurance application).  Nor does our conclusion rest on 
Freeth’s contention that Pennsylvania law requires insureds to perform an “affirmative 
act” of writing beyond signing a preprinted document (such as handwriting the desired 
dollar amount of coverage, or placing checkmarks or initials immediately beside the 
dollar amounts) in order to manifest their intent to reduce UM coverage.  There is some 
support for that view among non-binding authorities,1 but other cases suggest otherwise,2 
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not, to our knowledge, spoken directly to the 
issue.3  In any event, this case does not require us to opine on the matter.  Even if the 
mere act of signing a document like the Summary Form would ordinarily suffice to 
reduce coverage, it did not suffice here for the reason already given — namely, that 
language on the Summary Form itself clearly and repeatedly stated that signing the 
Summary Form was insufficient to effect a reduction in coverage.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.     
                                              
 1 Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triboski-Gray, 584 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690-91, 694-97 
(M.D. Pa. 2008); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Larrimore, 987 A.2d 732, 734-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2009).  
 2 Davis v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Co., No. 13-CV-07038, 2014 WL 4857434, at *6-
7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2014); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 438 F. Supp. 2d 
526, 535-39 (E.D. Pa. 2006).  
 3 In Orsag, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the use of handwritten 
markings, though relevant to the issue of intent, was not dispositive.  15 A.3d at 901 n.3 
(“Although not dispositive in this case, this argument is even more compelling here as the 
amounts of UM/UIM were handwritten on the application, suggesting the amount of 
coverage desired was discussed and considered by appellants prior to making their 
selection.”).    
